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THE TAXATION OF ALIMONY: POLICIES, PROBLEMS AND A
PROPOSAL
JOHN H. DAVIES*
Alimony payments are taxable to the wife and deductible by
the husband; however, to be considered alimony, the payments
to the wife must be both out of the husband's current income and
in discharge of his legal obligation to support his wife. This is a
peculiar statutory definition, because it refers to both the source
and application of the payments and the author suggests that
Congress was unable to decide whether alimony payments are an
income or expense item. The result of this congressional ambiva-
lence has been an unequal application of the laws: those who
have expert legal advice can reap advantages of this confusion.
The author examines the policies behind the two approaches to
taxing alimony and suggests statutory reforms to cure the present
inequities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Alimony payments are taxable to the wife as she receives them
and deductible by the husband as he pays them.' Fortax purposes,
alimony payments are limited to payments that are both (1) in
discharge of the husband's legal obligation to support the wife,
rather than to discharge her dower or other marital rights, and (2)
out of the husband's current income, rather than his past savings,
or "capital." Accordingly, payments to discharge obligations other
than the support of the wife and payments constituting divisions of
capital are neither taxable to the wife nor deductible by the hus-
band.2 Payments for child support also are not taxable to the wife
and not deductible by the husband.3
The obligation-of-support requirement is set forth in the stat-
ute in subjective terms. The Internal Revenue Code refers to "a legal
obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship is
imposed on or incurred by the husband."I The Treasury Regulations
1. I.R.C. §§ 71 (a), 215. Although these sections are phrased in terms of payments by
the "husband" and receipts by the "wife," section 7701(a)(17) states that these terms are
interchangeable. Likewise, the references in this article to "husband" and "wife" are for
convenience only; the reverse is also to be understood. Where the, context requires, the terms
"husband" and "wife" include "former husband" and "former wife." This too parallels the
concept of interchangeable terms in section 7701(a)(17).
2. There is no express Code section so providing, but the long-standing practice of the
Internal Revenue Service indicates that such payments are simply not to be thought of as
'gross income' within section 61. See part III, infra.
3. I.R.C. §§ 71(b), 215.
4. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1). Section 71(a)(2) contains a similar phrase. Section 71(a)(3) refers
to "her support and maintenance."
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and committee reports equate this language with the husband's
obligation of support.' By contrast, the Code does not refer directly
to an out-of-income requirement but rather to "periodic payments"
of an indefinite sum and to "installment payments" of a fixed prin-
cipal sum extending for "more than 10 years."' The Treasury Regu-
lations note that the statute does not in fact require the payments
to be made from income,' but the committee reports clearly state
that the intent behind "periodic payments" and the "10-year rule"
was to draw an objective line between payments out of income and
payments out of capital.'
This is a peculiar statutory approach. Congress chose to define
alimony by reference to both the source and the application of the
payments. No other tax item is so treated. Usually, income items
are taxed solely by reference to their source (e.g., dividends, capital
gains, tax-exempt bond interest), and expense items are treated for
tax purposes solely by reference to the application of the payment
(e.g., business expense, personal expense, capital expenditure). By
conditioning alimony both as to its source and its application, Con-
gress was apparently unable to make up its mind as to whether
alimony payments really are income items or expense items.
From the wife's standpoint, of course, the alimony she receives
is income either way; and from the husband's standpoint, the pay-
ments are deductible either way. That is not the problem. The
problem is whether the wife's alimony income is to be considered
income from the husband or whether the wife should be considered
as by-passing the husband and receiving income in place of the
husband. From the husband's standpoint, the question is not
whether alimony is deductible, but whether alimony is deductible
as a true expense or whether the deduction is simply a device for
splitting the husband's income so that part of it will be considered
directly as the wife's income. These are questions that go to the very
heart of what is taxable as alimony. They go first to determining the
appropriate tax policy underlying the taxation of alimony and from
there to determining the correct statutory definition of alimony.
The two policies which underlie these statutory requirements
are logically inconsistent with each other. Acceptance of one re-
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957); H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942).
6. I.R.C. §§ 71(a), 71(c).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(2)(1957). See also note 35 infra, and accompanying text.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong,, 2d Sess. (1942).
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quires rejection of the other. On the one hand, the taxation of ali-
mony payments to the wife and the deduction of those payments by
the husband could be viewed as an "income-splitting" device, the
policy being to tax the wife on that which is truly her income and
to tax the husband only on that which is truly his income. In this
case, the reasons why the wife received the income (as support or
otherwise) would be irrelevant, and the portion of the current stat-
ute requiring that the payments be in discharge of the husband's
obligation of support could be repealed.
On the other hand, the taxation of alimony to the wife and the
deduction of alimony by the husband could be viewed as the pay-
ment of an expense, namely the expense of supporting the wife. The
policy permitting its deduction would be that it represented an
extraordinary, non-discretionary expenditure which materially re-
duced the husband's ability to pay taxes. It could be likened to the
deduction of major medical expenses or casualty losses. In this case,
it would not matter whether the expense was paid out of current
income or past savings of the husband, and the portion of the stat-
ute which requires, in effect, that the payments be out of current
income could be repealed.
Those who doubt the practical importance of selecting between
these two policies rather than continuing with a statute that reflects
both need only look at the case-by-case results of over thirty years
of operating under the current statute. Upon a confused statutory
base has grown a body of law that is equally confused, complex and
artificial. As a result, those that are fortunate enough to have the
benefit of expert tax advice can usually cause their alimony pay-
ments to be taxed to the husband or to the wife depending upon who
is in the lower tax bracket. In this way, the lowest possible combined
tax will result.' Often, the result is a lower tax than Congress proba-
bly intended. Those without expert advice, however, can easily step
into one or more of the statutory pitfalls that await the uninitiated.
Their combined tax may turn out to be much higher than that
which was intended by Congress.
The objective of this article is to review these two competing
policies in light of their broad implications and practical problems
9. The lowest tax will be paid if both the husband and wife have exactly the same
amount of taxable income. The joint return rates automatically produce this result for mar-
ried couples.
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and to determine which one should govern the taxation of alimony.
Before taking up these subjects, however, it might be helpful to
review briefly the basic statutory rules for the taxation of alimony.
These are found in sections 71, 215, and 682 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
II. THE BASIC RULES
A. Section 71(a): Alimony Payments
Payments are treated as alimony-taxable to the wife and de-
ductible by the husband-only if the payments are made pursuant
to one of three types of written documents. These are: under section
71(a)(1),10 a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance or a writ-
ten instrument incident to such divorce or separation; under section
71(a)(2), a written separation agreement; and under section
71(a)(3),a decree for support or maintenance.
Section 71(a) also includes an entire shopping list of additional
requirements. Some of these statutory rules apply regardless of the
type of written document. To be taxable as alimony, the payments
must be "periodic."" Although section 7 1(a) expressly states that
to be "periodic" the payments do not have to be made at regular
intervals, this requirement obviously means something more than
a single lump-sum payment. The payments must also be made in
discharge of the husband's legal obligation to support the wife. This
subjective requirement has caused considerable confusion.' More-
over, although the Code is silent on the point, the Treasury Regu-
lations provide that the husband and wife actually must be living
apart. 13
On the procedural level, payments made by the husband under
section 71(a) are includible in the income of the wife only when
actually received by her (which is the general rule for the cash
method of accounting) regardless of whether she is using the cash
method or the accrual method of accounting for other purposes."
Moreover, if the husband and wife file a joint return, the payments
10. All references to "sections" are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended.
11. See part V infra.
12. See part VI infra.
13. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(b)(2)(i)-(3)(i) (1957). Oddly, this requirement is not mentioned
for divorced or legally separated couples utilizing section 71(a)(1).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(5) (1957).
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for that year will not be considered alimony."5 This problem might
arise if the husband and wife are not yet divorced but merely sepa-
rated.
Each of the three subsections under section 71(a) also has its
own separate rules: Under section 71(a)(1), the payments must be
made after a "decree of divorce or of separate maintenance" has
been entered and in discharge of a "legal obligation" imposed on or
incurred by the husband "under the decree" or "under a written
instrument incident to the divorce or separation."
Under section 71(a)(2), even if the husband and wife are not
divorced or legally separated, they may enter into a "written separa-
tion agreement" to achieve the same effect for tax purposes. The
Treasury Regulations state that even a separation agreement which
is not legally enforceable will satisfy section 71(a)(2).11 The agree-
ment, however, must have been executed after August 16, 1954, the
date on which section 71(a)(2) was executed. 7 If a later written
agreement is based on an earlier written agreement executed before
that date, the later agreement must constitute a material alteration
or modification of the earlier agreement in order to comply with the
August 16, 1954 date." The actual payments under section 71(a)(2)
must be made after the agreement was executed and pursuant to
it."9 Thereafter, if the parties become divorced or legally separated,
payments made pursuant to the written separation agreement will
continue to qualify."
Under section 71(a)(3), the payments must be made after Au-
gust 16, 19541 and pursuant to a decree for support or maintenance
entered after March 1, 1954.22 The Treasury Regulations state that
any type of support or maintenance order or decree will do.23 A
decree of separate maintenance is not required (such a decree is
already covered by section 71(a)(1)). The Treasury Regulations cite
an interlocutory decree of divorce and a decree of alimony pendente
lite as examples of decrees satisfying section 71(a)(3).24
15. I.R.C. §§ 71(a)(2), (3).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(i) (1957).
17. Id.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(ii) (1957).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(i) (1957).
20. Id.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(i) (1957).
22. 1.R.C. § 71(a)(3).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(i) (1957).
24. Id.
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As to the March 1, 1954 date, a decree which is altered or
modified after March 1, 1954 will qualify." The Regulations, in
contrast to those under section 71(a)(2), omit any reference to
"material" alterations or modifications. Apparently, an order by a
court making even a minor alteration or modification will be
deemed sufficient to. re-date an earlier order or decree. 26
B. Section 71(b): Child Support
Payments to the wife for child support are neither taxable to
her nor deductible by the husband." This is true of payments desig-
nated as child support even if they are pursuant to one of the types
of documents in section 71(a), and in all other ways within section
71(a).
Section 71(b) specifies that the children must be "minor" chil-
dren.2" They must be children "of the husband. '2 9 The payments
must be "fixed," in terms of money or a part (fraction or percentage)
of a larger fixed payment and earmarked exclusively for the chil-
dren; and all this must be spelled out in the decree, instrument or
agreement. 0
If the husband falls behind in his alimony and child support
payments and then makes only a partial payment, section 71(b)
specifies that the partial payment is to be considered first in satis-
faction of his child support obligation. Only after this obligation is
fully up to date will any remaining payments be considered ali-
mony.31
The proper tax treatment of child support payments is a sub-
ject that is beyond the scope of this article. The considerations are
not the same as those underlying support payments for the wife.
Congress, through joint returns, has permitted the husband and
wife to be treated as a taxpaying unit. Congress has not yet focused
on the entire family as a taxpaying unit. Moreover, separated or
divorced husbands and wives are seen as being able to fend for
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(ii) (1957).
26. See Rev. Rul. 62-115, 1962-2 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 74-393, 1974-2 C.B. 28.
27. I.R.C. § 71(b).
28. The Tax Court has held that "minor" means age 21 regardless of state law. William
E. Borbonus, 42 T.C. 983 (1964).
29. Treas, Reg. § 1.71-1(e) (1957).
30. Id.; Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
31. I.R.C. § 71(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(e) (1957).
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themselves when it comes to being taxed on income used for support
payments. Children are not. Finally, it is the husband and wife who
are separating or getting divorced. Legally, except for the question
of who gets custody of the children, the status of parent and child
remains unchanged.
C. Section 71(c): Installment Payments
Section 71 does not provide rules for lump sum property divi-
sions. Because they are omitted from section 71, these are not con-
sidered to be alimony. Thus, no income would be reportable by the
wife and no deduction would be available to the husband. Each
would simply be congidered to be drawing down what was his or her
own property all along.
Section 71(c), however, represents an attempt to draw a line
between alimony payments on the one hand, and property divisions
not paid in a lump sum but in installments, on the other. Section
71(c) provides that installment payments of part of a principal
(lump) sum will not be treated as periodic payments (and therefore
not alimony income to the wife and not deductible by the husband)
if the installments do not extend beyond ten years. The principal
sum must be specified in the decree instrument or agreement and
must be stated in terms of money or property. The Treasury Regula-
tions require that the total of the principal sum either be stated in
the section 71(a) document or be able to be calculated from the
language of the document."2 For example, it would be sufficient to
specify payments of "$1,000 per year for 5 years" without expressly
stating the $5,000 total.
If the installment period extends beyond ten years, however,
section 71(c)(2) states that the payments shall be treated as
"periodic" for purposes of section 71(a). To avoid a loophole in
which, for example, ninety percent of a principal sum paid in the
first year and one percent paid in each of the subsequent ten years
might qualify as alimony even though the ninety percent really was
very close to a lump sum payment, section 71(c)(2) limits the maxi-
mum per year that can qualify as periodic to ten percent of the total
principal sum. Thus, in the example, only ten percent rather than
ninety percent would qualify as alimony in the first year. The re-
maining eighty percent received in the first year would be a lump
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(ii)(b) (1957).
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sum payment. The one percent amounts in each of the subsequent
ten years, of course, would qualify as periodic because each would
be well within the ten percent rule. Section 71(c)(2) then closes a
second loophole by providing that the ten percent rule applies re-
gardless of whether the amounts which exceed ten percent are paid
on time (as specified in the decree, instrument or agreement) or as
pre-payments relating to future years.
A key feature of section 71(c), however, is that it only goes to
the question of whether particular payments are periodic. If they
are, for example, because the payments are of a principal sum but
are to last beyond ten years, that does not automatically mean that
all of the other requirements of section 71(a) are also satisfied so
that the payments qualify as alimony. It simply means that the
payments are "periodic": that one of the requirements in section
71(a) is satisfied. All of the remaining requirements of section 71(a)
outlined above also must be satisfied before the payments will be
considered alimony. If, on the other hand, the document calls for a
fixed principal sum payable evenly over ten years or less, then it is
certain that the payments are not periodic. Lacking that one re-
quirement, the payments cannot be alimony under section 71(a).
D. Section 215: Deduction for the Husband
If the wife is taxable on alimony received from the husband, he
may take a deduction under section 215. The Code as, revised by
Tax Reform Act of 1976 makes alimony deductible from gross in-
come in arriving at adjusted gross income.3 If the wife is not taxable
on the amount received because it is an installment payment of a
principal sum payable over a period of ten years or less within sec-
tion 71(c), or a child support payment within section 71(b), or a
lump sum property division (not within section 71 at.all), then the
husband cannot take a deduction under section 215.
There are, moreover, three additional instances in which the
wife is taxable because of the receipt of income but the husband still
cannot take a section 215 deduction. Assume first that a lump sum
property settlement occurs pursuant to which the husband transfers
to the wife certain income-producing securities. That transfer is not
taxable to the wife and not deductible by the husband. It is not
covered by section 71 at all. But the wife now owns the securities,
33. I.R.C. § 62(a)(13) (as added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455 § 502(a)).
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and when they produce income, the income will belong to the wife,
and she will be taxed on it. The husband still will not get a deduc-
tion even though he once owned the securities. Section 71(d) accom-
plishes this by stating that the husband's income does not include
amounts (1) includible in the wife's income as alimony and (2)
attributable to transferred property. Section 215 then denies the
husband a deduction for amounts covered by section 71(d).
This is a fair result since the husband, by transferring complete
ownership to the securities, has also succeeded in keeping all future
income from them out of his tax return. By comparison, if he had
kept the securities and then used the income from them to pay
alimony, he would first have had to report the income from the
securities as his income and then offset it with a section 215 deduc-
tion.
The second instance in which the wife is taxable on the receipt
but the husband gets no deduction is in the case of a trust. Instead
of transferring the securities just mentioned directly to the wife,
assume that the husband places them in a trust. The trustee is to
pay the trust income to the wife. She is taxed on the receipt of such
trust income as alimony. Sections 71(a)(1) and 71(a)(2) expressly
permit the use of a trust to discharge the husband's obligation to
make periodic payments. The payments still are alimony if all of the
other rules are satisfied. The husband, however, does not have to
report the trust income as his income because of section 71(d). In-
come from a trust is considered to be income attributable to trans-
ferred property. Therefore, he does not get a deduction under sec-
tion 215. a' If anyone should get a deduction, it is the trust, and
sections 651 and 661 so provide.
The third exception to the general rule that section 215 allows
a deduction to the husband when the wife is taxed on the receipt
involves section 682 trusts. Section 682 provides that the income of
any trust (not already covered by section 71(a)) received by a wife
who is divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance, or who is separated under a written separa-
tion agreement, shall be taxable to the wife and not includible in
the gross income of the husband. Because section 682 serves to keep
the trust income out of the husband's income, he has no need of a
34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.215-1(c) (Example 1) (1957).
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section 215 deduction. Section 215, therefore, denies the husband a
deduction for such income.
E. The Section 71(a) Alimony Trust
As just noted, there are two kinds of alimony trusts, those cov-
ered by section 71(a) and those covered by section 682. It is neces-
sary to examine each of these in more detail. Sections 71(a)(1) and
71(a)(2) state that the husband's obligation to make periodic pay-
ments which are taxable to the wife as alimony can be satisfied (if
the decree, instrument or agreement so provides) by a transfer of
income-producing property to a trust. Typically, the trustee would
be instructed to make the appropriate alimony payments to the wife
out of the trust income and then, when the husband's alimony obli-
gation ceases, to return the income-producing property to him.
Interestingly, section 71(a) only extends the use of a trust to
section 71(a)(1) (decrees of divorce or separate maintenance) and
section 71(a)(2) (written separation agreements). An alimony trust
may not be based upon a support decree or order in section 71(a)(3).
Section 71(a)(3) specifically refers to payments received "from her
husband" under a decree "requiring the husband to make the pay-
ments" and contains no reference at all to the use of a trust.
As noted earlier, although the husband cannot take a deduction
under section 215, the trust itself can take a deduction under either
section 651 or 661 to the extent that all or a portion of its income is
required to be distributed or in fact is distributed to the wife. The
trust must rely on section 651 or 661; it cannot rely for a deduction
on section 215. Section 215 is available only for non-trust payments
made directly by the husband. This creates two differences. A trust
deduction under section 651 or 661 may be taken for income
required to be paid regardless of whether it actually is paid by the
end of the year. Correspondingly, under section 652 and 662, the
wife must include such amounts in income for the year the trust is
required to pay even though she in fact did not receive the amount
by the end of the year. By contrast, a section 215 deduction is
available only for an actual payment by the husband. To the wife,
direct alimony payments are income only when actually received.
The second difference is that sections 651 and 661 permit de-
ductions only of that portion of the payment from the trust which
is deemed to be out of the annual trust income even though section
71 requires the wife to include in her income the entire payment.
13651977]
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By contrast, if a trust is not used, so long as the payment is a
"periodic payment" a section 215 deduction is available for the full
amount included by the wife in her income under section 71. It is
conclusively presumed that the payment came from current income
regardless of whether the husband in fact made the payment from
his current income or from his capital."
F. The Section 682 Alimony Trust
Section 682 also taxes alimony trust income to the wife and
prevents such income from being taxed to the husband. Section 682
applies only to trusts which are not within section 71(a).36 In cases
in which both sections would apply, the rules in section 71(a) con-
trol.37 In some respects, section 682 is narrower than section 71(a).
Section 682 taxes trust income to the wife and keeps the trust in-
come out of the husband's income only if (1) the husband and wife
are divorced or are legally separated under a decree of separate
maintenance or (2) the husband and wife are separated under a
written separation agreement. Section 682 thus goes only as far as
sections 71(a)(1) and 71(a)(2). A section 71(a)(3) support order
will not do. Section 682, moreover, taxes to the wife and not to the
husband only that portion of the payments which are deemed to be
out of trust income. Payments out of principal are not to be taxed
to the wife. By contrast, payments out of principal would be taxed
to the wife if the trust satisfied the requirements for a section 71(a)
alimony trust.
In other respects, section 682 is broader than section 71(a).
Section 682 applies regardless of whether the payments are
"periodic" and regardless of whether the payments are made
"under" the divorce or separate maintenance decree or the separate
maintenance agreement. Section 682 also applies regardless of
whether the separate maintenance agreement pre-dates August 16,
1954 and regardless of whether any substantial modification of a
pre-existing separate maintenance agreement took place after Au-
gust 16, 1954. In fact, as noted earlier, section 682 applies even to
payments that are not made. The only requirement is that the wife
be "entitled to receive" the amounts in question.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(2) (1957).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-l(a)(2) (1957).
37. Id.
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Section 682 contains an exception for payments specifically ear-
marked for child support. Just as under section 71(b), such pay-
ments would not be income to the wife. The trust would get a deduc-
tion under section 651 or 661 for child support payments made out
of trust income, but the husband would be the one who would have
to report the income under section 677 since the payments would
operate to discharge his obligation of support. Moreover, the hus-
band would not be entitled to a deduction under section 215; the
treatment of child support payments under section 682 to all parties
would be exactly the same as if the trust were governed by section
71(a) or indeed as if there were no trust at all and the husband made
the payments directly.
This summary of the statute, while far from complete, should
serve to facilitate an understanding of the more detailed discussion
that follows. Before proceeding to a discussion of the policy consid-
erations and problem areas underlying the federal income taxation
of alimony, however, it will be helpful to consider how the tax treat-
ment of alimony and related payments compares with similar pay-
ments by a husband to (or for the benefit of) his wife and children
prior to separation or divorce.
III. PAYMENTS DURING MARRIAGE
A. Support Payments
Many payments between happily married couples could be
characterized as gifts. As such, they would be excluded from federal
income taxation under section 102. Unless they were quite large,
they would also avoid federal gift taxation.38 True support pay-
ments, however, cannot be considered gifts for income tax purposes
because they are usually motivated by the legal or moral obligation
that the husband has to support his wife and children." Generally,
it is to discharge these obligations rather than simply to show his
love and affection that a husband provides for the support of his wife
and children. Accordingly, support payments would not qualify as
"gifts" for income tax purposes.
Why then are support payments not taxable income to the wife
and children? If they are not gifts, no section of the Internal Reve-
38. See I.R.C. §§ 2503(b), 2505, 2523. Respectively, these sections provide an annual
exclusion of $3,000 per donee, a variable credit, and a marital deduction.
39. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
nue Code expressly excludes them. Why are they not simply
"income" within section 61, which states that ". . . income means
all income from whatever source derived . . ."? Basic as this ques-
tion is, it never has been answered directly, presumably because it
has been Internal Revenue Service policy never to raise it. The
position of the Internal Revenue Service is that support payments
are just not "income" as that term is used in section 61.
If support payments were "income," they would not be offset
by any matching deductions of the husband because the payments
would be his "personal" expenses, and thus not deductible under
section 262. Nor would the husband be able to deduct them as being
in satisfaction of a preexisting debt, because payments of preexist-
ing debts are never deductible; they are not "expenses" at all.
From the wife's perspective, characterizing the payments as
being in satisfaction of a preexisting debt owed to her by her hus-
band would not enable her to avoid realizing income. The argument
for taxation would be that the payments would be in exchange for
her surrender of an intangible asset, her right to support, and that
she should be taxed as if she were disposing of an asset. The problem
with this argument is that her asset, her right to support, cost her
nothing; and so she has no basis for it. Lacking a basis, even if she
is considered to have given it up in exchange for the support pay-
ments from her husband, her gain logically still should be the full
amount received.
Introducing joint return rates into the picture also is no help if
support payments are viewed as personal expenses to the husband. 0
Even though a wife and husband can combine their income and
deduction items by filing a joint return, they still would not be able
to offset support payment income to the wife (if such should exist)
by support payment deductions of the husband because, as already
noted, the husband is not entitled to any deductions for personal
expenses. The joint return election does not change this rule.
The conceptualization thus comes full circle back to alimony.
If the only way to rationalize the non-taxation of support payments
during a marriage is that such payments simply are not "income"
within the general statutory definition, then why should such
40. I.R.C. § 1(a). The joint return rates produce a result that is the same as if the
husband and wife each earned exactly one-half of their joint income. This causes their joint
income to be taxed in the lowest possible brackets.
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payments be taxable as "income" under section 71 upon divorce
or separation? On the deduction side, if support payments during
a marriage are non-deductibel personal expenses, why should
such payments be deductible under section 215 upon divorce or
separation?
Perhaps a better rationalization for the non-taxation of support
payments during a marriage is to view such payments simply as an
optional splitting of the husband's income between him and his
wife. That is, by electing to file a joint return, the husband and wife
are agreeing that one-half of the husband's income really is income
directly owned by, and taxable to, the wife and vice versa.
If the source of the husband's income is property rather than
personal services, then a joint return election, in effect, treats the
husband's property as community property and the income there-
from as community income which is automatically owned in equal
shares by both. This theory receives support from the legislative
history behind the joint return provision. One reason for its enact-
ment was to place taxpayers in non-community property states on
a more equal footing with taxpayers in community property states.4'
Comparing this rationale with the taxation of alimony to the
wife and its deduction by the husband produces a more logical
result. Just as the joint return option serves to treat the wife as the
true taxpayer of part of the husband's income, so too the alimony
provisions treat part of the husband's income as income of the wife.
The husband is then allowed a deduction not because the payment
is a true expense but because he is permitted to remove that portion
of income from his return that really is not his income at all. The
legislative history of the alimony provisions lends some support to
this view. Among the reasons cited in favor of enacting the predeces-
sors to sections 71 and 682 was that income used for alimony should
be considered income of the wife and not income of the husband.2
B. Non-Support Payments
Attention now is turned from alimony to payments for marital
rights other than support. These include payments in discharge of
dower and other statutory rights to the husband's property. Non-
41. H.R. REP. No. 127-4, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-26 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 241,
257-60.
42. See part IV infra.
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support payments during a marriage are not analogous to support
or alimony because they usually are gifts-the husband is under no
legal obligation and is probably motivated by love and affection. A
look at pre-marital payments for such marital rights, however,
sheds some light on this problem. In Farid-Es-Sultaneh v.
Commissioner" the wife-to-be received some shares of stock pur-
suant to a pre-marital agreement in return for her release of dower
and other marital property rights. The Second Circuit held that her
basis for the stock (for the purpose of computing gain on her later
resale) was equal to the full fair market value of the stock when she
received it.
Was the receipt taxable to the wife-to-be in Farid? That issue
was not before the court. The implication is that the receipt was
taxable. How else would the wife have been entitled to a new basi5
equal to the full fair market value of the stock? Dictum in an opin-
ion from the District Court for the Southern District of New York
also supports the theory that such pre-marital payments are taxa-
ble.4 By contrast; if similar payments are made as damages, for
example, for breach of promise to marry, the rule is that the pay-
ments are not taxable." The distinction seems to be that pre-
marital payments for release of marital rights result in a true reali-
zation of gain, an enrichment, while payments for damage to mari-
tal rights do no more than make the taxpayer whole, without enrich-
ment.
If this distinction between pre-marital release payments and
damage payments is valid, which rule should apply to divorce pay-
ments for marital property rights? On the one hand, divorce pay-
ments are paid for a release of the marital rights." On the other
hand, there are strong similarities between a divorce and a breach
of promise to marry which would lead to a non-taxable result. In any
case, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that payments pur-
suant to a divorce in discharge of the wife's dower rights are not
taxable. 7 The reason given was that the value of the wife's dower
rights was equal to the value of the property received. This is puz-
zling because it is arguable that the wife has no basis in her dower
43. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
44. Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
45. See United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 310 (1960). (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
46. Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805, 808 (1943) (dictum).
47. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
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rights, and it is not value, but the difference between basis and the
amount received that measures gain upon the disposition of prop-
erty." Perhaps an alternative reason that payments upon divorce in
discharge of dower rights should not be taxable is that there has
been no disposition. The wife is merely drawing down what was her
property all along. This is different than in the Farid situation be-
cause a wife-to-be has no pre-existing rights in her husband's prop-
erty, whereas a wife, after marriage, does have such rights. If this
approach is adopted, it would follow that the wife, upon receipt of
property in discharge of her dower or other statutory rights, would
take the same basis that the husband had so that the same potential
gain (or loss) would carry over.
The next section of this article considers the history of the
present statutory provisions, with particular emphasis on whether
the legislative and constitutional arguments for taxing alimony to
the wife seem to rest on an income-splitting policy or an obligation-
of-support policy.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Alimony Payments Before 1942
Initially, a question was raised as to whether Congress intended
alimony to fall within the general statutory definition of "gross in-
come" in what is now section 61. In 1917, the Supreme Court in
Gould v. Gould" held that alimony was not within the statutory
definition of income. The Court, in a three page opinion, simply
concluded that alimony did not fall "fairly within any of the terms
employed"50 in the statutory definition. After Gould, there was no
satisfactory way to plan for alimony payments which would be taxa-
ble to the wife and deductible by the husband. Direct periodic pay-
ments were ruled out in Gould. Even if alimony payments had been
held to be income in Gould, they still would have been personal
expenses, not deductible by the husband.
There was only one sure way to shift the taxation of income to
the wife. The property which was to produce the income first had
48. I.R.C. § 1001. The anomaly presented in this situation may be resolvable by conceiv-
ing of the wife's basis in her dower rights as inchoate until the moment the taxable transaction
occurs. Thus there could never be a recognition of gain at that point in time.
49. 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
50. Id. at 153.
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to be transferred outright to the wife. Thereafter, the income earned
from the property would be taxable to the wife simply because she
owned the property. However, most husbands were unwilling or
unable to make outright transfers.
B. The Alimony Trust Before 1942
Before the predecessors to sections 71(a) and 682 were enacted
in 1942 alimony trusts were usually considered to be "grantor"
trusts, that is, trusts which were set up to make payments to the
wife which would discharge the legal obligation of the husband to
support his wife or children.' The general rule was (and still is, in
section 677) that trust income paid to discharge the support obliga-
tion of the grantor should be treated as constructively paid to the
grantor and thus should be taxed to the grantor. Sections 71(a) and
682 have changed that rule where they apply, but the rule remains
intact in situations such as child support payments not covered by
sections 71(a) or 682.
Prior to the enactment of sections 71(a) and 682, however, there
was one possible escape from the grantor trust rule. The one way to
assert that alimony was taxable to the wife and not to the husband
under an alimony trust was to argue that the initial lump sum
transfer of property into the trust was itself in satisfaction and com-
plete discharge of the husband's obligation of support."2 Thereafter,
if no obligation of support existed, the future income payments from
the trust property could not be in discharge of any support obliga-
tion of the husband. The trust, therefore, could not be a grantor
trust. If it was not a grantor trust, the trust income was taxable,
under the general trust rules, to the wife as the beneficiary entitled
to receive it.53
The difficulty with this argument, of course, was in proving
that the initial transfer into the trust, not the subsequent income
payments, discharged the husband's obligation. This was tanta-
mount to arguing that the wife rather than the husband was the true
grantor and that the placing of the property in trust rather than the
making of a direct lump sum transfer of the property to the wife was
primarily for her benefit and not for the husband's benefit. In prac-
51. E.g,, Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1935).
52. E.g,, Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69, 75 (1940).
53. I.R.C. §§ 652, 662.
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tice, the trust device was probably most often sought by the hus-
band as a way to transfer only the income from the property to the
wife while retaining and preserving the underlying remainder inter-
est in the property for himself.
Most of the cases which involved this issue looked to whether,
under state law, the initial transfer to the trust did or did not dis-
charge the husband from his legal obligation of support. In 1940, in
a series of three cases, the Supreme Court approved the controlling
effect of state law.54 But even in those states which would have held
that an initial transfer to a trust would have discharged the hus-
band's legal obligation, the opportunity proved illusory. The hus-
band still had to make an actual lump sum transfer to a trust.
Many were still unwilling or unable to do this for personal or finan-
cial reasons.
C. The Legislative History of the 1942 Changes
Congress felt that it was unfair to discriminate between those
husbands who could afford to shift the taxation of income to the wife
by making a lump sum payment to her and those who could not
afford such a settlement but had to rely instead on periodic pay-
ments out of their current income from services or property. The
legislators reasoned that periodic payments out of income consisted,
in effect, of splitting the income between husband and wife and
that, accordingly, the taxation of the income should be similarly
split.,
Additionally, Congress was spurred to enact some relief for sep-
arated or divorced couples from the high wartime tax rates." Per-
haps it was even thought that by allowing a husband to deduct
alimony he might be induced to pay larger amounts to his ex-wife.57
Finally, Congress wanted to end the uncertainty and lack of uni-
formity under varying state laws that resulted from using alimony
trusts to discharge the husband's obligation of support. 8
54. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940);
Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940).
55. See 88 CONG. REC. 6377 (1942) (remarks of Rep. Disney); House WAYS & MEANS
COMM. REP., H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942); SEN. FIN. CoMM. REP., S.
REP. No. 673, Part 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1941).
56. See HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM. REP., H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46
(1942).
57. See Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 302 (1961) (dictum).
58. See Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-1(a)(3) (1957).
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D. The Constitutionality of Section 71.
For these reasons, sections 71, 215 and 682 were enacted in 1942.
The constitutionality of section 71 was upheld in 1950 by the Court
of Claims in Mahana v. United States" and in 1954 by the Tax
Court in Daisy M. Twinam.60 This constitutional question still has
not been passed upon by the Supreme Court although certiorari was
denied in Mahana. In Twinam, the Tax Court expressly left open
the question of whether alimony was constitutionally taxable to the
wife as income if the husband had no income and had in fact made
the payments from other property. The Tax Court later answered
this question in favor of taxing his wife in Muriel Dodge Neeman.,
The Second Circuit affirmed. 2
In Twinam and Mahana the argument was made that the Su-
preme Court, by implication, had already decided against the con-
stitutionality of taxing alimony received by the wife as part of its
1917 decision in Gould. The argument ran that the general statutory
definition of income under review in Gould represented an exercise
by the Congress of the full power to tax which was contained in the
16th amendment; therefore, the meaning of "income" in the statu-
tory definition and in the 16th amendment was exactly the same.
The decision in Gould, that alimony was not within the statutory
definition, therefore, had to mean that alimony was also not within
the 16th amendment.
This argument was rejected in Mahana simply by observing
that the Supreme Court in fact had not directly taken up the spe-
cific constitutional question of whether alimony was income under
the 16th amendment, and the Court's general statements in other
cases as to the congressional intent to exercise fully the 16th amend-
ment power should not be taken so literally. Everyday usage, said
Judge Madden for the Court of Claims in Mahana, would dictate
that one who had received alimony payments "would be regarded
as having an income." 3 Four years later, the Tax Court in Twinam
agreed with the Court of Claims. The Tax Court in Twinam re-
peated the Mahana arguments and added the argument that ali-
59. 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 978 (1950).
60. 22 T.C. 83 (1954). Accord, Eleanor C. Shoemaker, 38 T.C. 192 (1962); Ruth W.
Cooper, 31 T.C.M. (P-H) 62,226 (1962).
61. 26 T.C. 864 (1956).
62. 255 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1958).
63. 88 F. Supp. at 288.
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mony may constitutionally be taxed to the wife by analogy to the
split taxation of income from community property which was up-
held by the Supreme Court in Poe v. Seaborn.14
More than thirty years have passed since sections 71 and 682
were enacted. It now seems safe to assume that the Court would
uphold the constitutionality of these sections. To do so, however, it
would have to reject the premise that the 16th Amendment is coex-
tensive with section 61 as regards alimony, as the Court of Claims
did in Mahana. Alternatively, it would have to reject its own prior
decision in Gould, or adopt the income-splitting rationale in Poe v.
Seaborn.
E. Summary
It is clear from the foregoing that there exist two separate and
competing policies. The first of these policies is to treat divisions of
income separately from divisions of capital. Divisions of the hus-
band's income are to be taxed as alimony while divisions of his
capital are not. Today this is based on a desire to harmonize the tax
situation of a divorced husband and wife with that of a married
couple who can rely on the joint return provisions to divide their
income. Historically, it is based on the notion that income ought to
be taxed to the party who ultimately received it.
The second policy is to treat payments in discharge of the hus-
band's support obligation separately from payments in discharge of
other obligations of the husband to the wife. Support payments are
to be taxed as alimony while payments in discharge of other obliga-
tions are not. Historically, this policy appears to be grounded largely
in sympathy for a husband who was required to pay such -large
amounts to support his wife that he was thereby rendered unable
to pay his own federal income taxes out of the income he had left.
The high tax rates in effect during World War II (when the alimony
provisions were adopted) contributed to the sympathy that Con-
gress felt for the husband. 5
Regarding the first policy, sections 71(a) and 71(c) were the
primary devices used by Congress to separate divisions of income
from divisions of capital. Payments in indefinite duration, lump-
64. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
65. SEE HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM. REP. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 46
(1942).
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sum payments and installment payments of a fixed principal sum
extending for not more than ten years were considered divisions of
capital, while installments extending for more than ten years were
considered periodic payments and thus divisions of income. The
rationale for such a division was purely a practical one. The longer
the period over which a series of installment payments extended,
the more likely that current income was the primary source for such
payments. On the other hand, if the installment period was rela-
tively short and if the total of the payments was fixed and agreed
upon at the outset, it was likely that the husband planned to dip
into his accumulated capital in order to make the payments.
Section 71(a) was the primary vehicle used by Congress to carry
out the second policy, to separate payments in discharge of the
husband's support obligation from payments in discharge of other
marital obligations which he had to his former wife. In section 71(a),
alimony treatment was expressly reserved for payments made
"because of the marital or family relationship""6 or "for her support
and maintenance. ' 67
It is inconsistent to base the taxation of alimony on both of
these policies. Either the wife's alimony comes from the husband or
it comes from the same sources as the husband's income. It cannot
come from both. Either the husband is paying a personal expense
or he is simply excluding income which is not his income. He is not
doing both. The difficulty is to decide which policy is preferable. An
overview of the broad legislative and constitutional considerations
has been presented. In the end, the choice must turn in large part
on practical considerations. Which policy would result in a tax
structure which is easier to understand and easier to administer?
These considerations must be examined. The first to be discussed
will be those arising out of the obligation-of-support requirement.
V. THE OBLIGATION-OF-SUPPORT REQUIREMENT
A. The Statutory Language
Sections 71(a)(1) and (2) require that periodic payments, to be
taxed as alimony, be in discharge of a "legal obligation which, be-
cause of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred
66. I.R.C. §§ 71(a)(1)-(2).
67. I.R.C. § 71(a)(3).
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by the husba'id." On its face, there might be some question as to
whether this language can be restricted to the husband's obligation
or support. As interpreted in the Treasury Regulations, however,
this language is equivalent to the husband's legal obligation of sup-
port: "Section 71(a) applies only to payments made because of the
family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obliga-
tion to support which is made specific by the decree, instrument,
or agreement." 8
This Regulation was taken almost verbatim from the House
Ways and Means Committee report." Section 71(a)(3) includes this
requirement by referring to "payments for her support or mainte-
nance." If payments are intended to discharge any of the wife's
other property rights, they will not qualify as alimony. This is true
even of other property rights which arise by reason of the marriage.
For example, in Bernatschke v. United States," payments of
$25,000 per year in discharge of the wife's dower rights were held by
the Court of Claims not to be in discharge of a "marital obligation."
B. Circumstantial Evidence: The Balancing of Factors
It is often difficult to place the correct label on payments made
between husband and wife. In Charles S. Presbey" the Tax Court
found that payments labelled "alimony" really were repayments of
a loan from the wife prior to the marriage. Alimony treatment was
denied. The Treasury Regulations contain a similar example.7" Re-
cently the Tax Court held that a lump-sum $20,000 payment was
not alimony for tax purposes because it was not in discharge of the
husband's obligation of support even though the $20,000 was paid
pursuant to an order of a New Jersey court which referred to the
payment as "alimony.'' 73
In other cases the nature of the payments has been used to
suggest whether or not they were paid in discharge of the obligation
of support. For example, in Van Orman v. Commissioner,74 the Sev-
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957).
69. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942).
70. 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. C1. 1966).
71. 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 70,082 (1970).
72. Tress. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957) (repayment of a loan is not a payment in discharge
of a legal obligation to support).
73. Martha Pierce, 66 T.C. 840 (1976).
74. 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969).
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enth Circuit held that mortgage payments by the husband on a
home for the wife were in satisfaction of a property right rather than
alimony. The court said that the taxpayer's obligation was "to pro-
vide a lump sum to the ex-wife."75 The fact that the mortgage on
the house was to last more than ten years (so that the ten-year
installment provisions of section 71(c) were avoided) did not change
the character of the obligation: "The mere fact that the taxpayer
chose to pay off the basic obligation in conveniently small amounts
does not change the character of the basic obligation.""6
In Van Orman the court's conclusion was reinforced by the fact
that, in addition to the obligation to supply the wife with a home
and pay the mortgage, there existed another periodic payment obli-
gation which was concededly alimony. This approach, rejecting one
provision in a property settlement agreement because alimony has
clearly been provided elsewhere, has also been used by the Ninth
Circuit.77
Other circumstantial evidence may tip the scales in cases where
the direct evidence of intent is not clear. A wife receiving, in kind,
property which she initially contributed to the marriage has been
held to be receiving the property in satisfaction of property rights
other than her right to support.7" Similarly, a recital in the decree
that "there shall be no alimony" plus circumstances indicating that
the parties attempted to divide the property equally has been found
by the Tenth and Sixth Circuits to be a property settlement rather
than alimony.7 9
State law also has an impact on whether the payments are
intended as alimony. In Martha K. Brown, 0 payments that were
considered alimony before the wife remarried were not alimony
thereafter because, under state law, a husband had no obligation to
pay alimony after his ex-wife re-married. On the other hand, in
West v. United States,' installment payments of a fixed sum were
alimony because, under state law, a fixed total sum of alimony was
always required to be stated in the decree.
75. Id. at 171.
76. Id. at 171-72.
77. Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959).
78. Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971).
79. Lambros v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972); McCombs v. Commissioner,
397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968).
80. 50 T.C. 865 (1968), af'd per curiam, 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969).
81. 332 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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Some courts rely on their own special recipe of factors. In
Hayutin v. Commissioner,2 total payments of $3,500 were held to
be for support. The Tenth Circuit looked to "the true nature of the
transfer under Colorado law" and determined that, as to the $3,500,
the "factors are inconsistent with the idea of co-owned property.""3
The Tenth Circuit cited the divorce court's discretion to divide the
marital estate based, among other things, upon the value of the
estate, the financial condition, health, age, earning ability of each
of the parties, and the contribution of each to the marital estate.
In the end, what if the court has considered all the factors it
thinks are relevant and still is not sure of the purpose of the
payments? The Tax Court has an answer. The purpose may be held
to be a dual purpose-neither the property settlement purpose nor
the support purpose would predominate and the payments may be
allocated between the two. 4
C. After the Death of the Husband
The initial question is whether the intent of the parties is to
have the alimony obligation survive the death of the husband. In
Fairbanks v. Commissioner,"5 the Ninth Circuit held that an agree-
ment entered into between the wife and the trustees and executors
of the husband's estate after the husband's death was merely a
modification of the earlier right of the wife to receive alimony and
was not a substitution of a new agreement for the old alimony right.
Accordingly, the court held that the payments mbde by the execu-
tors and trustees subsequent to the husband's death continued to
be taxable as alimony to the wife.
Even if the parties intend the alimony obligation to survive,
some state statutes provide that there shall be no obligation to
continue paying alimony after the death of the husband. In some
cases, the state statute may control. In other states, however, it may
82. 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974), aff'g, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 509 (1972).
83. Id. at 469.
84. E.g., Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. 349 (1969) (acq.). For other cases in this area,
see Coker v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 169 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd 456 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1972);
Grant R. Bishop, 56 T.C. 720 (1971) (acq.) (payments to repay a former loan from the wife
to the husband); Enid P. Mirsky, 55 T.C. 664 (1971) (payment to divest wife's interest in
property held in tenancy by entirety); Edith M. Gerlach, 55 T.C. 156 (1970) (payments to
buy out the wife's interest in community property).
85. 191 F.2d 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1951).
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still be possible for the parties to voluntarily agree that payments
will continue to be made to the wife from the estate of the husband
or from a trust fund set up by his estate.
In the latter states, the question is whether the payments will
continue to be treated as alimony for tax purposes. In Ada M.
Dixon,6 the question before the Tax Court was whether payments
to the wife pursuant to a settlement agreement continued to be
alimony even though they extended beyond the death of the hus-
band and were paid from his estate. The wife alleged that the pay-
ments could not be alimony, arguing that New York law did not
allow alimony after the death of the husband. The Tax Court con-
strued the New York law to mean that although the obligation to
pay alimony ceased at the husband's death, the husband could
voluntarily contract to provide for the wife both before and after his
death. 7 The court then held that the payments after the husband's
death were still in discharge of the husband's earlier legal contract
obligation to provide alimony.
Judge Mulroney dissented in Dixon. In his view, after the death
of the husband, the wife received payments which were not pur-
suant to the earlier settlement agreement but pursuant to the will
of the husband. Judge Mulroney was thus drawing a distinction
between payments directly connected to an earlier legal obligation
and the payments in Dixon which were only indirectly connected to
the earlier agreement (but directly connected to the will of the hus-
band). An additional problem not mentioned in either the majority
or dissenting opinion in Dixon was how, in the absence of a statute,
the legal obligation could be said to have arisen "out of the marital
or family relationship." If it could not, any undertaking by the
husband to continue support after his death must either have been
86. 44 T.C. 709 (1965).
87. The Tax Court in Dixon cited three California cases for the proposition that pay-
ments made by a husband's estate were deductible by the estate as alimony even though
California law specifically prohibited alimony after the husband's death. One was United
States v. Soltermann, 163 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1958). The Tax Court's citation to the
district court opinion in Soltermann appears to be erroneous. No mention was made of
whether alimony payments could continue after the death in this opinion. It dealt solely with
the distinction between property settlements and alimony payments. The case was appealed,
however, and the issue was touched upon in dictum at the circuit court level. Soltermann v.
United States, 272 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1959). The other cases were: Helen Scott Fairbanks,
15 T.C. 62 (1950), aff'd 191 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915; Daisy M.
Twinam, 22 T.C. 83 (1954).
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gratuitous or based upon some other consideration. In either case
the payments would not be alimony.
D. After the Remarriage of the Wife
Payments to the wife which continue beyond her remarriage
can, in general, still qualify as alimony." But again, under state law,
the legal obligation of the husband to pay alimony may cease upon
the remarriage of the wife. In Allen Hoffman"9 the Tax Court held
that, under Illinois law, payments made pursuant to a settlement
agreement were taxable as alimony to the wife prior to her remar-
riage but not thereafter. Although the agreement specified that the
payments would continue to be made, Illinois law provided that any
legal obligation of the husband to pay alimony would cease upon the
wife's remarriage. 0 The Tax Court concluded that "state law is
determinative of the existence of a 'legal obligation' for purposes of
section 71(a)(1)."' In so holding, the Tax Court rejected the Com-
missioner's contention that the reference to a "legal obligation" in
section 71(a)(1) did not depend upon state law but was rather a
federal standard referring to a general obligation of support which
arose from the marital or family relationship.
Although its earlier opinion in Dixon was cited in the Hoffman
opinion, the Tax Court made no attempt to explain the difference
in the results of the two cases. Comparing the opinions the Tax
Court found that in Dixon, New York law provided that although
the obligation to pay alimony ceased at the husband's death, the
husband may voluntarily assume an obligation to continue alimony
after his death. In Hoffman, the Illinois statute provided essentially
the same thing, but there was no express finding that the voluntary
undertaking to provide alimony after the remarriage of the wife or
the death of either party was (or was not) enforceable.
88. Rev. Rul. 70-557, 1970-2 C.B. 10. Payments apparently intended to be for the support
of the children subsequent to the wife's remarriage were held to be alimony because the
payments were not sufficiently "fixed" within the meaning of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
89. 54 T.C. 1607 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1972).
90. The Illinois statute provided in part that, "[a] party shall not be entitled to alimony
and maintenance after remarriage; but, regardless of remarriage by such party' or death of
either party, such party shall be entitled to receive the unpaid installments of any settlement
in lieu of alimony ordered to be paid or conveyed in the decree." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 19
(1956).
91. 54 T.C. at 1611.
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The court in Hoffman relied upon its earlier decision in Martha
K. Brown92 in which it held that, because the husband's sole liability
was imposed by the decree and because state law provided that
alimony was to cease upon the wife's remarriage, payments made
after the wife's remarriage were not pursuant to a "legal obligation"
and therefore were not taxable to her under section 71(a)(1).
An interesting final twist was added in Herbert I. Joss. 3 The
Tax Court held that because the obligation of the husband to make
alimony payments terminated upon the remarriage of his wife, pay-
ments actually received by the wife after her remarriage (due to the
fact that she did not disclose such remarriage to her former hus-
band) were includible in her gross income as embezzled funds under
section 61. In such a case, the payments presumably would be de-
ductible by the husband under section 165(c)(3) as a theft loss. The
net effect would be almost the same as alimony treatment.
E. After Annulment
A problem which is similar to those just discussed is whether
payments which otherwise would have been alimony will be con-
strued as such if, instead of ending in divorce, the marriage ends in
an annulment. The issue is whether, by reason of the annulment,
the marital or family obligation of the husband which otherwise
would have existed is no longer imposed upon him under state law.
If a marriage has been annuled, will it be recognized as ever having
existed so as to give rise to a family or marital relationship? If not,
there could be no obligation of support arising therefrom.
In George F. Reisman 4 the Tax Court held that payments made
by the husband pursuant to an annulment decree should be treated
as alimony under section 71. The court adopted a flexible approach
to interpreting the tax provisions: "We believe the Federal statute
here involved is more concerned with the function of the payments
rather than the lable of the action under which they were decreed." '95
As to the issue of whether a "family or marital relationship" ever
existed, the court indicated that it would disregard the fiction that
an annulment defaces a marriage "as if it had never been." In
92. 50 T.C. 865 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969).
93. 56 T.C. 378 (1971).
94. 49 T.C. 570 (1968) (acq.).
95. Id. at 572.
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support, the court cited several New York cases to the effect that
the fiction of an annulment could be ignored for state law purposes
as the "purposes of justice" are deemed to require."
In apparent response to the argument that an annilment de-
cree could preserve the obligation of support only if the grounds for
the annulment arose subsequent to the marriage,97 the Tax Court
cited two previous Tax Court cases in which the grounds for the
annulments existed at the time of the marriage and held that
whether the grounds existed prior to the marriage or arose subse-
quent to the marriage made no difference.
F. After an Invalid Divorce Decree
Interestingly, although the Internal Revenue Service ac-
quiesced in Reisman, it announced that it would not follow the
decision of the Second Circuit in Borax v. Commissioner. 11 In Borax,
the Second Circuit held that a Mexican divorce should be upheld
as valid for purposes of section 71 even though the decree had al-
ready been declared invalid by a New York court.
In so holding, the Second Circuit cited the goals of certainty
and uniformity which it said were fostered by permitting the tax
consequences to be determined by the Mexican decree. In addition,
the court noted that its result would be in accordance with the
policy of taxing payments made in cases of separated couples to the
person who actually received and had the use of the payments.9
Judge Friendly, in dissent, pointed out that Borax is inconsist-
ent and in conflict with the Ninth Circuit opinion in Gersten v.
Commissioner."'0 Judge Friendly would have had the court base its
96. The Tax Court also cited, in support, Rev. Rul. 59-130, 1959-1 C.B. 61; Anne S.
Laster, 48 T.C. 178 (1967) (acq.); Lily R. Reighley, 17 T.C. 344 (1951).
97. See Rev. Rul. 59-130, 1959-1 C.B. 61.
98. 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) (non acq.); Rev. Rul.
67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65.
99. See also Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952), which held that a
Florida divorce decree would support the treatment of periodic payments as alimony under
section 71 even though the Florida decree was subsequently declared invalid by a New York
court.
To be contrasted with Borax is the situation in which the original court which granted
the divorce subsequently reverses itself and declares the divorce obtained invalid. In Estate
of Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C. 664 (1962), the Tax Court held that under these circumstances,
the element of a "decree of divorce" was missing. For further discussion of this area, see
Spolter, InvalidDivorce Decrees, 24 TAX. L. REv. 163 (1969).
100. 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
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decision upon the New York judgment invalidating the Mexican
decree. He pointed out that if the Commissioner were now to bring
an appeal from the related Tax Court decision which had held that
the wife need not include in income the payments made by Borax,
the Second Circuit would be hard pressed to meet her argument
that she should not have to include the payments as alimony be-
cause, under the subsequent judgment of the New York court, she
was indeed not divorced from Borax. Carrying Judge Friendly's
opinion to its logical conclusion, one can imagine a situation in
which a husband and wife, having been declared divorced in Mex-
ico, might resume living together after the Mexican decree was de-
clared invalid. Would all subsequent support payments made by the
husband to the wife be deductible as alimony under the majority
opinion in Borax?''
In Gersten the husband and wife were residents of California.
The husband obtained a divorce in Mexico and immediately there-
after remarried and attempted to file a joint return for federal in-
come tax purposes with his second wife. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court and held that the husband and second wife were not
permitted to file a joint return. Even though there had been no
express finding by a California court that the original Mexican di-
vorce and the subsequent marriage were illegal and void, the Ninth
Circuit so held for tax purposes and then went on to conclude that
the husband and his second wife could not file a joint return. As
Judge Friendly noted in his dissent in Borax, it is not possible to
distinguish the Ninth Circuit opinion in Gersten from that of the
majority of the Second Circuit in Borax simply on the ground that
Gersten involved the filing of a joint return While Borax involved the
question of whether alimony payments were deductible by the hus-
band.
To be compared with Gersten is Louise Ross' where the Tax
Court held that payments received by the wife were alimony even
though she had originally married her husband one day before he
was divorced from his first wife. The second wife argued unsuccess-
fully that her marriage to the husband was therefore invalid and
that there was no need for a subsequent divorce decree. The Tax
101. A denial of alimony treatment in such a case presumably could not rest on the
ground that the husband and wife were living together since the Regulations do not apply
that requirement to section 71(a)(1).
102. 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 2061 (1964).
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Court declined to decide this question, deferring instead to the state
court which had granted the divorce and which had apparently'
passed on the validity of her marriage. The state court, in granting
a divorce, apparently had found that, even though the wife had
married her husband one day before his divorce from his first wife,
such marriage was valid and there was need of a divorce decree to
end the marriage.
Recently the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit
over whether an earlier ex parte divorce which was later held to be
invalid would control the question of who was the surviving spouse.
In Steffke v. Commissioner'"3 the Seventh Circuit held that the later
decision declaring the divorce invalid would control, while in
Spalding v. Commissioner:'04 the Second Circuit, citing Borax, fol-
lowed the earlier divorce decree.
The Second Circuit explained in a subsequent case,'"5 decided
just eleven days after Spalding, that the state court decision declar-
ing the divorce decree invalid would be respected only if that deci-
sion were from the state where the parites resided.
G. The Existence of a Decree, Instrument or Agreement
Closely allied with the question of whether a decree is invalid,
as discussed in Borax and similar cases, is the question of whether
the required decree; instrument or agreement as specified in section
71(a) was ever in existence. In Sylvia E. Taylor'° the Tax Court took
a rather strict, view of this requirement. The court held that no
decree could be found. The wife had requested an award of tempo-
rary alimony which had been denied by the state court on the
ground that the husband was already paying her $60 per week on a
voluntary basis. In another similar situation, the husband was de-
nied a divorce from his wife but was ordered to pay her $20 a week., 7
The Tax Court held that these payments were not deductible ali-
mony to the husband since they were not pursuant to a decree of
divorce or separation and there was no evidence of a written separa-
tion agreement. It is not clear why these payments did not fall into
103. 538 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976).
104. 537 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1976).
105. Goldwater v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. 55 T.C. 1134 (1971).
107. Thomas A. Walston, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 714 (1958). See also John S. Healey, 54 T.C.
1702 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5217 (4th Cir. 1971).
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section 71(a)(3) which provides that alimony may be based upon a
decree for support.
By contrast, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled in favor of
a support order entered by a New York court based upon an ex parte
divorce granted to the husband in a Florida proceeding which had
not provided alimony to the wife. The Service ruled that the order
by the New York court was within section 71(a)(3). It noted that:
[t]he legislative history of section 71(a)(3) of the Code empha-
sizes that the factual status of whether the parties are living apart
rather than their exact marital status in law is to be the key in
determining whether amounts paid by the husband under a court
order or decree for support of the wife are deductible.108
A common situation which is similar to payments made in the
absence of a decree of divorce is the situation in which payments
are made before they are required to be made by the decree. The
Tax Court has held that such payments are not deductible as ali-
mony. 1 1 Because such payments are in advance of those called for
in the decree, they are deemed gratuitous. They are not made pur-
suant to the husband's obligation of support.
H. Incident to Such Divorce or Separation
Section 71(a)(1) requires that the payments be made in dis-
charge of a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family
relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under the
decree of divorce or decree of separate maintenance. This section
adds that the legal obligation may also be imposed upon or incurred
by the husband under a written instrument "incident to such di-
vorce or separation."
For years, a controversy has existed as to whether the phrase
"incident to such divorce or separation" meant incident to the
decree of divorce or separate maintenance or whether it meant sim-
ply incident to the status of divorce or legal separation. If payment
108. Rev. Rul. 70-61, 1970-1 C.B. 18. The Internal Revenue Service cited in support of
its liberal construction, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1948). In a similar situation,
a divorce decree "terminated" the husband's duty to support but left a prior support order
in effect. The Tax Court found section 71(a)(3) satisfied. Jeanne S. Knobler, 59 T.C. 261
(1972). A support decree from an ecclesiastical court, however, did not qualify under section
71(a)(3). Harry L. Clark, 40 T.C. 57 (1963).
109. George R. Joslyn, 23 T.C. 126 (1954), rev'd in part and aff'd in part on other
grounds, 230 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1956).
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was required to be incident to the decree, further questions arose.
Were written instruments executed before as well as after the decree
to be included? Did the written instrument actually have to be
referred to in the decree? In Mahana v. United States"' the Court
of Claims in 1950 expressly declined to decide whether "incident to
such divorce or separation" meant incident to the status of divorce
or legal separation rather than to the decree. The court noted that
resolution of the issue was not necessary to its decision since the
payments in Mahana qualified as alimony under either interpreta-
tion.
In 1954 the Second Circuit, and in 1957 the Ninth Circuit,
rendered decisions holding that "incident to the status" of divorce
or legal separation was sufficient."' The Internal Revenue Service
announced it would follow these decisions upon substantially simi-
lar facts."' The Treasury now seems to accept the status argument.
The Regulations refer to "a written instrument incident to such
divorce status or legal separation status. "I" Since 1954, moreover,
the addition of sections 71(a)(2) and 71(a)(3) which now permit
alimony pursuant to a written separation agreement or a decree for
support, has brought under the alimony umbrella additional written
instruments which might not otherwise be incident to either the
status or the decree of divorce or separate maintenance.
Still, the issue continues to surface. Notwithstanding the posi-
tion in the Treasury Regulations that "incident to the status" is
sufficient, the Tax Court has continued to approach the problem
somewhat differently. Although the Tax Court has held that the
agreement must be incident to the decree, it has adopted liberal
views on what is incident to the decree. According to the Tax Court,
the agreement need not necessarily be mentioned in the decree." 4
Indeed, the divorce decree need not mention an obligation for ali-
mony. The question is one of fact which may be proved in other
110. 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 978, reh. denied, 340 U.S. 847
(1950).
111. Hollander v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957); Newton v. Pedrick, 212
F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1954), rev'g 115 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see Helen Stewart Cramer,
36 T.C. 1136 (1961); Holt v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
982 (1956).
112. Rev. Rul. 60-140; 1960-1 C.B. 31.
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(1) (1957). (emphasis added).
114. Randal W. Clark, Jr., 58 T.C. 519 (1972).
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ways, for example by oral testimony."' In one case, the Tax Court
held that a payment was alimony even though the agreement under
which it was paid was not mentioned in the decree, and the wife had
testified that the payment was intended as a property settlement."'
I. -Payments to Third Parties
A problem which is indirectly related to the husband's obliga-
tion of support can arise in the case of payments by the husband to
a third party for the benefit of the wife. The question is whether the
indirect benefit received by the wife is equivalent to a direct pay-
ment in discharge of the husband's obligation to support the wife.
In Phillips v. United States,"' a district court in Florida held that
the husband was not entitled to a deduction for payments to the
wife's sisters. The payments served to discharge the wife's moral,
but not legal, obligation to support her sisters. The wife, therefore,
was not charged with alimony income and the husband's deduction
was denied. In Robert Lehman,"' by contrast, payments by the
husband to the wife's mother, whom the wife did have a legal obliga-
tion to support, were held to be alimony by the Tax Court.
It is difficult to distinguish these cases. The husband should get
a deduction in either case if an indirect payment was agreed upon
between the parties and if it substitutes for a direct payment. It is
similar to the payment of life insurance premiums. The payments
to the wife's sisters in Phillips did bestow a benefit on the wife
just as much as the payments in Lehman if it is accepted that in
Phillips the wife herself, would otherwise have made the payments
to her sisters. The Internal Revenue Service has entered a non-
acquiescence in Phillips."9
Another common clause in a decree or property settlement
agreement requires that the husband pay the wife's medical expen-
ses. This is another example of an indirect payment that should
qualify as alimony.' It should make no difference whether the hus-
115. See Elizabeth W. McCullough, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 360 (1968).
116. William M. Joslin, Sr., 52 T.C. 231 (1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1970).
117. 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-477 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
118. 17 T.C. 652 (1951), aff'd, 234 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 926
(1956). See also Melvin A. Christiansen, 60 T.C. 456 (1973) (acq.) (holding payments to the
wife's niece and nephew of whom the husband and wife had legal custody before the divorce
were alimony).
119. Rev. Rul. 62-106, 1962-2 C.B. 21.
120. Illene Isaacson, 58 T.C. 659 (1972) (acq.).
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band pays the doctor or hospital bills directly or reimburses the wife
for them. In either case, the wife should have alimony income if the
payments substitute for direct support payments. Premiums for
medical insurance also should qualify as alimony.'"' The wife would
then be entitled to treat as medical expenses under section 213 all
medical expenses or premium payments charged to her as ali-
mony. 12
2
J. Alimony Trusts
As noted earlier, both section 71(a) and section 682 provide tax
rules for alimony trusts. Section 71(a) governs those alimony trusts
created pursuant to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or
pursuant to a written separation agreement. Alimony trusts not
covered by section 71(a) are covered by section 682.
Historically, section 682 was enacted to eliminate the differ-
ences in tax treatment between alimony trusts which were created
for reasons other than divorce or separation and trusts which were
created in contemplation of divorce or separation.2 3 Trusts created
pursuant to ante-nuptial agreements would be examples. Under
section 682, any trust not created in contemplation of divorce will
qualify for alimony treatment after the date of the divorce or sepa-
rate maintenance decree or the property settlement agreement. For
example, in A. M. Daniel2 1 the IRS apparently conceded that in-
come from a trust which was received by the wife was taxable to her
under section 682. The husband in A. M. Daniel had assigned part
of his interest in a preexisting trust to his wife.'25
This is surprising because absent section 682, section 71, with
all of its complex rules, is the exclusive route to alimony treatment.
121. See F. Ewing Glasgow, 21 T.C. 211 (1953); Aline S. Fisher, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 507
(1956).
122. If the payments are for past medical services, however, they might constitute sepa-
rate lump-sum payments or installments of a fixed principal sum payable in ten years or less
and thus not alimony under section 71(c). See F. Ewing Glasgow, 21 T.C. 211 (1953).
123. See S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
124. 49 T.C. 484 (1968) (acq.).
125. To be compared with A. M. Daniel is Richard T. Daniel, Jr., 56 T.C. 655 (1971),
aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1972). In Richard T. Daniel the Tax Court held that
amounts paid from a trust in which the husband had a beneficial interest were includible in
his income since he had not transferred the beneficial interest to his wife. Because the
amounts were not periodic payments, the husband was also not entitled to deductions under
section 215.
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The main difference under section 682 is the absence of the support
requirement. Under section 682, the trust income is taxable to the
wife regardless of whether the trust has any connection with the
husband's obligation to support the wife."' Because section 682 ig-
nores the obligation-of-support requirement, it represents a pure
income-splitting device. Thus, if Congress is really serious in achiev-
ing uniformity in the treatment of alimony trusts, section 682 repre-
sents a strong argument for also eliminating the support require-
ment from section 71.
Experience with the support requirement of section 71(a) trusts
has uncovered a problem concerning the discretion given the
trustee. If too much discretion is given to the trustee, the right to
income may be held to be in satisfaction of obligations in addition
to the husband's obligation of support. If there is too little discre-
tion, the right to income may be held not broad enough to cover the
husband's obligation of support. The Internal Revenue Service has
held "'27 that even though a transfer in trust satisfied all of the formal
requirements of section 71(a), distributions of income were not in-
cludible in the wife's gross income where the distributions were
limited to purposes other than the general support of the wife.
Another problem under section 71(a) is whether the so-called
trust conduit rules apply. The Internal Revenue Service has held
that these rules do not apply, and all payments received by the wife
from a section 71(a) trust are taxable to her as alimony payments
(ordinary income) regardless of the nature of the income to the
trust."8 The Sixth Circuit held in 1969, however, that a receipt by
the wife of income which was tax-exempt income to the trust re-
tained its character as tax-exempt income in the hands of the wife. 2 '
The Internal Revenue Service disagreed. 3 '
With regard to section 682 trusts, the conduit rules clearly
apply. 3' Thus, capital gains remain taxable as capital gains to the
wife, tax-exempt interest remains tax-exempt, and distributions out
of trust capital are tax free. Looking ahead to the following discus-
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-l(a)(3) (1957).
127. Rev. Rul. 74-94, 1974-1 C.B. 26.
128. Rev. Rul. 65-283, 1965-2 C.B. 25.
129. Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969).
130. Rev. Rul. 74-94, 1974-1 C.B. 26.
131. I.R.C. §§ 652(b), 662(b). In addition, section 682 requires that only those items
which otherwise would have been includible in the husband's income be included in the wife's
income.
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sion on the income-splitting policy, if that policy were adopted as
the sole policy governing all alimony payments, the trust conduit
rules might serve as a starting point for solving the problem of
separating income from capital.
Before leaving this discussion of trusts, however, it must be
pointed out that although the use of a trust solves some problems,
it creates others. One problem is whether a trust exists at all. Courts
have wrestled with whether a transfer of property constituted an
absolute transfer of the property .to the wife or merely a temporary
transfer in trust with the wife receiving only a beneficial right to the
income from the property. In Micholas C. Miller, 32 for example, the
question before the Tax Court was whether a leasehold interest had
been transferred outright to the wife or merely placed in trust. This
question was complicated in Miller by the fact that the property in
question, a leasehold interest, was in economic terms a mere right
to income. The court, in holding that a transfer in trust had been
effected, relied upon the formality of the transfer, the fact that both
husband and wife joined in the transfer, and the fact that the wife
was entitled only indirectly to the leasehold income.
The fact that a mere right to income was involved in Miller
raises another interesting question. Can a trust be created to hold
property which is no more than a mere right to income? Miller
supports an affirmative answer in the case of leasehold interests, but
an attempted transfer of a right to salary income, for example,
might produce a different holding. If a trust is held not to exist, the
attempted transfer might then be treated as an anticipatory assign-
ment of income. The husband, not the wife, would be taxed on the
income. The only recourse would be an argument that, after charg-
ing the income to the husband, the court should imply periodic
payments from husband to wife which satisfied section 71. This
might be pushing the court too far, especially since the original
transfer was, in fact, a lump-sum transfer. If the transfer of the
income rights to the trust were upheld, however, then section 71 (or
section 682, if applicable) should clearly override the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine, and the income should be taxed to
the wife and not to the husband as in Miller.
132. 49 T.C. 484 (1968) (acq.).
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VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF INCOME-SPLITTING
A. Periodic Payments
Section 71(a) limits alimony treatment to "periodic pay-
ments." Thus a lump-sum payment will not qualify as alimony.'33
If the duration of the payments is indefinite, so that it is impossible
to be sure of the eventual total, the payments will be "periodic."' 34
This is true even of payments which extend only over a short time.
Often, however, a series of payments is fixed either by stating a
fixed total amount or by stating a fixed number of payments. In this
case, section 71(c) comes into play.
B. The Ten- Year Rule
Section 71(c) represents a congressional attempt to draw an
objective line between income divisions and capital divisions. It
drew this line at installment payments extending for not more than
ten years. Installment payments of a fixed principal sum extending
for not more than ten years generally are treated as capital divi-
sions, while installment payments extending for more than ten years
are treated as "periodic payments."
By adopting the ten-year rule and the requirement of "periodic
payments," Congress avoided the harder to prove question of
whether the payments actually came from the husband's income.
The Treasury Regulations state that alimony treatment does not
depend upon whether the payments in fact came from the hus-
band's income.'35 Payments from the husband's capital can qualify
as alimony so long as the ten-year test is met. As a practical matter,
however, Congress knew that payments stretched out over a long
term were more likely to come from current income whereas pay-
ments over a short term were more likely to come from the hus-
band's capital.
Lest there be any doubt, the committee reports expressly state
that the ten-year rule and the concept of "periodic payments" were
intended, in a general way, to limit alimony treatment to payments
out of the husband's income. 3 ' The staff report of the Senate Fi-
133. I.R.C. § 71(c).
134. See Treas. Reg. 1.71-1(d)(3) (1957).
135. Treas. Reg. 1.71-1(c)(2) (1957).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
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nance Committee, in support of the 1976 amendment that permits
the section 215 deduction to be taken from gross income in arriving
at adjusted gross income, stated:
It is argued that the splitting of income or assignment of income
through the payment of alimony is not properly treated under
current law since only an itemized deduction is allowed for ali-
mony. The view often expressed is that the payment of alimony
should be taken into account in determining net income. '37
Objective though it may be, however, the ten-year rule has spawned
a number of problems. The following sections are directed toward
examining these vexing questions.
C. The Three Contingencies
The Treasury Regulations'38 state that if installment payments
of an otherwise fixed principal sum are to extend for a period of ten
years or less they will be considered periodic and thus will qualify
as alimony "only if" such payments are subject to the contingency
of (1) death of either spouse, or (2) remarriage of the wife, or (3)
change in economic status of either spouse. The reason is that such
contingencies prevent the existence of a fixed principal sum.
The limitation of the Regulations to three stated contingencies
raises a question as to whether specifying other contingencies can
cause installment payments to be considered periodic. It can be
argued that in the Regulations the Treasury Department has at-
tempted to restrict the relevant contingencies td the three expressly
listed. On the other hand, it can be argued that other contingencies
can also serve to destroy the existence of a "principal sum." To
reconcile this latter argument with the Regulations, it could be
argued that the three contingencies listed in the Regulations will
conclusively be presumed to destroy the existence of a principal sum
whereas other contingencies may or may not have that effect but do
not have the benefit of a presumption. If the taxpayer intends to rely
on other contingencies, it is reasonable that he will have to prove
that their effect is to destroy the existence of the principal sum. For
example, this could be held to turn on whether the other contingen-
cies were substantial and likely to occur.
137. JOINT COMMITrEE STAFF REPORT FOR SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, Committee Print
3, (1976) (emphasis added).
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i)(a) (1957).
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The argument that the three listed contingencies are not exclu-
sive might be implied indirectly by the Regulations'39 which state
that any of the three will have the effect of rendering the install-
ments periodic regardless of whether such contingency is imposed
by express language in the decree, instrument or agreement or is
imposed by local law. These Regulations further state that the same
result will accrue even if an aggregate principal sum is stated explic-
itly in the agreement or even if the aggregate principal sum may be
calculated actuarially, for example, by reference to the life expect-
ancy of the wife.
The existence of any of the three contingencies listed in the
Regulations has one additional effect. If the payments are to extend
beyond ten years so that they would be periodic in any event, but
if they are also subject to any of the listed contingencies, then the
ten percent rule in section 71(c) will not be applicable. That is, a
large payment in one year can still qualify entirely as alimony even
if it exceeds ten percent of the principal sum. 40 This is presumably
because the existence of such a contingency will have the effect of
destroying the principal sum altogether thus rendering it impossible
to calculate ten percent of anything. Again, the next question is
whether other contingencies than the three listed could have the
same effect.
The Treasury Regulations were adopted in 1957.1" They were
based upon a series of cases which had held that the three contin-
gencies of death or remarriage or change in financial circumstances
destroyed a fixed principal sum.' In Myers v. Commissioner,"' the
Ninth Circuit held that specifying monthly payments of $250 for a
period of six years was not sufficient to spell out a principal sum
even though the total obviously was subject to exact mathematical
calculations. In Myers the contingency of remarriage was expressly
excluded. By contrast in Baker v. Commissioner' and in Smith's
Estate v. Commissioner4 ' the obligation to make payments was
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) (1957).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(4) (1957).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (1957).
142. E.g., Davidson v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1955) ("The existence
of these contingencies [death or remarriage] makes it impossible to determine in advance
with any degree of accuracy the amount to be paid under the decree").
143. 212 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1954).
144. 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
145. 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 31:1355
TAXATION OF ALIMONY
expressly contingent upon death or remarriage. The Second and
Third Circuits held that no principal sum existed. In Baker the
Second Circuit expressly declined to decide whether a contingency
of death by itself would be sufficient to destroy a principal sum, the
wife's life expectancy being predictable actuarially.
In Salapatas v. Commissioner4 ' the Seventh Circuit, in 1971,
upheld the Regulations and stated:
The purpose of the statute is to create a reasonably definite rule
by which to distinguish, at least in an approximate way, between
payments by a divorced (or legally separated) husband to his
divorced (or legally separated) wife which represent a division of
income for current needs of living from payments which represent
a division or transfer of capital, and to shift the impact of the
income tax from husband to wife with respect to the amounts of
the former type of payment.14
The court then went on to hold that the Regulations in question
were valid since they served the purpose for which the statute was
enacted.
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit in Salapatas did not com-
ment on the fact that the contingency which was upheld in that case
was to the effect that the husband's obligation to make installment
payments would terminate if the wife died before the full amount
was paid unless their child was still a minor. The child was 15 years
old at the time payments commenced and would have been just
short of 23 years old at the time of the last payment. This contin-
gency is not quite the same as the contingency of death specified in
the Regulations. This lends some weight to the argument that the
contingencies in the Regulations are not exclusive.
The Seventh Circuit decision in Lemasters v. Commissioner'48
might be contrasted with its earlier decision in Salapatas. In
Lemasters the court declined to find the contingencies of change in
economic status and death of the wife sufficient to destroy the prin-
cipal sum. The husband argued that a contingency as to economic
status was introduced by an Indiana statute which provided that a
separation agreement could be approved by a court in a subsequent
divorce proceeding only if it was executed fairly, without fraud,
146. 446 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g 28 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 1205 (1969).
147. Id. at 82.
148. 466 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1972).
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duress or undue influence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed this argu-
ment out of hand with the observation that such contingencies exist
with respect to all contracts.
The taxpayer then argued that the Indiana succession statute
provided that, if his wife predeceased him, he would inherit her
estate which would include all her rights to future payments under
the separation agreement. The husband argued that this amounted
to a contingency which would cause his obligation to cease upon the
death of the wife. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and
noted that the wife could make a will or the expenses of her estate
could intervene to deprive the husband of his right to receive back
her rights to all future separation payments. Although the court in
Lemasters does not expressly so state, by limiting its opinion to the
contingencies in the Regulations, the court implied that no other
contingencies could possibly have sufficed to destroy an otherwise
fixed principal sum.
D. The Dates of the Ten-Year Period
Another issue which is raised by section 71(c) is when the ten-
year period begins to run. This is often not as easy to determine as
it may seem. Assume, for example, that the parties have entered
into a property settlement agreement and then, at some later date,
the agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree. Assume also
that the payments are to extend for just under ten years from the
date of the divorce decree but would extend for more than ten years
if the date of the earlier property settlement agreement is used.
Which date controls? If the earlier property settlement agreement
date controls, section 71(c) is. avoided and the payments are ali-
mony.
In Joslin v. Commissioner' the Seventh Circuit first held that
the date depended upon whether the legal obligation to make the
payments stemmed from the property settlement agreement alone
or whether the subsequent divorce decree was necessary before the
obligation became operative.' 50 In Joslin, however, a new twist was
149. 424 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1970).
150. The court in Joslin cites numerous cases for its original proposition that the effective
date depends upon which document, the property settlement agreement or divorce decree, is
necessary in order to make the legal obligation effective. Among these are Estate of Spicknall
v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. Blumm, 187 F.2d 177,
180 (7th Cir. 1951); Munderloh v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 452, 458 (1967). In Spicknall, for
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added. The Seventh Circuit first assumed, arguendo, that the tax-
payer was correct; that the intent of the parties was to bind them-
selves to make the payments beginning with the earlier date of the
property settlement agreement. Even so, the court found that under
the law of Nevada, partieg to a divorce are powerless to so bind
themselves. The court found that the state divorce court may in its
discretion cast aside and refuse to adopt any agreement which the
parties might have entered into even though in the utmost good
faith. Accordingly, the court held that the later date of the divorce
decree controlled and the payments were not alimony.
The Joslin decision raises some interesting possibilities. As-
sume, for example, that the husband and wife entered into a written
separation agreement to be effective immediately but never got di-
vorced. Presumably, even in a state like Nevada, the date for pur-
poses of determining the start of the ten-year period would be the
date on which the written separation agreement was effective. This
situation differs from Joslin. There the payments were not to com-
mence until the divorce decree was entered. Next, assume that
after a written separation agreement is signed and the payments
commenced, a divorce decree is indeed entered under a statute
like the Nevada statute and that the written separation agreement
is approved. If the remaining payments under the written separa-
tion agreement have less than ten years to run from the date of the
divorce decree, is their character automatically changed from ali-
mony to non-deductible installments? Does that change relate back
to the payments made prior to the divorce decree? What is the effect
of the Treasury Regulation which provides that payments made
pursuant to a written separation agreement may continue to be
made under section 71(a)(2) (that is, under the agreement) even
though a divorce decree is subsequently entered so long as the agree-
ment continues in existence?15'
Perhaps, in a state such as Nevada, a subsequent divorce de-
cree would have the effect of splitting a single obligation into two
ogligations, one based upon the written separation agreement and
a second later obligation based upon the divorce decree. If so, it is
example, the settlement agreement was executed on January 17 and the divorce decree
entered on January 19. This difference of two days created payments extending for more than
ten years and thus rendered them deductible by the husband and includible in income by
the wife.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2) (1957).
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possible that both of them would end up being for less than ten
years. The one based upon the written separation agreement argua-
bly might still result in periodic payments because of the contin-
gency (at the time the agreement was originally signed) as to when
a divorce decree would be entered. On the other hand, such a contin-
gency is not one of those listed in the Regulations. Thus, the prob-
lem comes full circle back to the question of whether a nonlisted
contingency can serve to destroy the existence of a "principal
sum.)152
A related question will arise from an agreement or decree which
states that the husband's obligation to begin making payments
starts on one date although the first payment is not due until, say,
a month later. In Lillard v. Wiseman, 53 a district court in Oklahoma
held that the earlier date commenced the ten-year period. Accord-
ingly, the payments extended for more than ten years and were
deductible as alimony. If a decree awarding alimony is appealed,
the Tax Court has held that the ten-year period does not begin to
run until the appellate court renders its decision. 4 On the other
hand, the Tax Court recently held that the ten-year period began
to run when the divorce decree was entered even though the decree
did not become final until one year after that date.'55 It is virtually
impossible to reconcile these opinions.
Similar problems arise concerning the termination date. The
husband cannot simply stretch the payments to more than ten years
and thus avoid section 71(c) if the decree, instrument or agreement
does not, by its terms, permit him to do so.'56 Moreover, the Tax
Court in Westhafer57 held that an original period of less than ten
years had not been extended to more than ten years by a court order
specifying that an arrearage of $75 was to be paid on a date which
turned out to be more than ten years from the starting date. The
152. See Furrow v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1961). The Tenth Circuit held
that alimony payments prior to a divorce decree could not be tacked onto the period following
the divorce decree for the purpose of producing a period which extended for more than ten
years.
153. 57-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9282 (W.D. Okla. 1956).
154. Gordon M. Eno, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122 (1965).
155. William C. Wright, 62 T.C. 377 (1974).
156. Section 71(c)(2) expressly requires that the "terms of the decree, instrument, or
agreement" set the payment period. See also Robert D. Stecker, 31 T.C. 749 (1959), where it
was expressly held that non-compliance with a ten-year term would not serve to extend the
term to more than ten years.
157. 22 T.C. 561 (1954).
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court order related to back payments by the husband and thus did
not serve to amend the original agreement but rather to bring the
husband's payments back in line with the original agreement.
E. Unified Payments
A further problem relates to the manner in which a decree or
agreement is drafted. The question is whether payments intended
to be property settlements will be combined with other payments
intended to be alimony so that all of the payments will qualify either
as alimony or as a division of property. As a general rule, payments
which are treated separately in the agreement or decree will not be
lumped together into a unified plan."8 On the other hand, just be-
cause the agreement specifies two series of payments does not al-
ways mean that each will be characterized differently, one as ali-
mony and one as a property settlement. In the cases of Enid P.
Mirsky' and William M. Haag' the Tax Court held that two sepa-
rate series of payments were both intended as alimony. In Haag, one
of the series of payments was then disallowed as alimony however,
because it was for less than ten years.
In S. Brad Hunt'' the taxpayer contended that payments
under separate provisions of a settlement agreement should be
treated as a unified plan with the result that the payments would
extend for a period beyond ten years. In the settlement agreement,
the husband had agreed to pay $150 a month until he had paid
$15,000 (which would take place in less than ten years). Thereafter,
in a separate clause, the agreement provided that the husband
should annually pay to the wife the difference between the income
from certain stock and $2,400. The court held that these two clauses
should be construed separately with the result that the earlier pay-
ments, ending within ten years, did not qualify as alimony.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the decree or agreement
which in form states a single series of payments but which includes
a balloon payment either at the beginning or the end of the series.
158. E.g., Edward Bartsch, 18 T.C. 65 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 203 F.2d 415 (2d. 1953);
Estate of Frank C. Smith, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 1167, aff'd, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953). See also
Houston v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1971); Coker v. United States, 327 F. Supp.
169 (D. Nebr. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 456 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1972).
159. 56 T.C. 664 (1971).
160. 17 T.C. 55 (1951).
161. 22 T.C. 561 (1954).
19771 1399
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Of course, even if the entire series is determined to be periodic and
alimony, if it involves a fixed principal sum, section 71(c) might
apply so as to limit the amount to be treated as alimony in any one
year to a maximum of ten percent of the principal sum. If the series
is subject to a contingency, however, or if no fixed principal sum is
stated, the ten percent limitation will not apply. The question then
becomes whether the balloon payment is to be treated as a separate,
lump-sum, nonperiodic payment or as part of the series of periodic
payments and alimony. Most often, if the balloon payment is sub-
stantially larger than the others, the parties will have a difficult
time showing that it should not be treated as a separate non-
periodic payment.' On the other hand, if the balloon payment is
not substantially larger than the others, the parties may be able to
convince the court that the balloon payment should be treated as
part of a single series of periodic payments."3
A similar issue is whether a series of payments should be di-
vided if only part of the payments in that series is subject to con-
tingencies such as death or remarriage while the remaining part is
not. In 1972, the Tax Court held that such a series should be split
into two series.' The result was that one series, which was not
subject to contingencies, fell within the ten-year rule of section
71(c) and thus lost its character as periodic payments.
F. Community Property
Special problems are presented in those states which have
adopted the community property system. These involve differen-
tiating between payments which are to be treated as alimony and
payments which are simply property divisions. The eight states
which have adopted the community property system are Washing-
ton, California, Texas, New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Idaho and
Louisiana.
The landmark Supreme Court decision is Poe v. Seaborn,'
where the Court held that the income from community property
should be taxed one-half to each of the spouses because they were
162. See, e.g., Knowles v. United States, 290 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1961); Gordon D. Oxford,
21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321 (1973).
163. See, e.g., Helen L. Hilgemeier, 42 T.C. 496 (1964); Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522
(1968).
164. Randal W. Clark, Jr., 58 T.C. 519 (1972).
165. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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considered to be joint owners of that property. Therefore, upon a
separation or divorce the parties must contend with the fact that the
wife is already considered to be the owner of one-half of all the
community property. Accordingly, payments by the husband to the
wife, even though they may be cast in a periodic form, are not
treated as alimony to the extent that they merely discharge the
wife's claim against the community property. In other words, these
payments fail to meet the requirement that they be made out of the
husband's income.
A related distinction between community and noncommunity
property states is that in community property states a division of
appreciated community property does not result in gain or loss to
the transferor. 66 Under Davis v. United States,"7 such a division
would be considered a taxable exchange in a noncommunity prop-
erty state.
G. Indirect Payments
In general, the form of the payment does not determine whether
it qualifies as alimony or not. Payments may be in cash or other
property.6 8 It matters not whether the payments come directly from
the husband or from some other source pursuant to his direction.
According to the Treasury Regulations, the payments may be direct
or from property in a trust, a life insurance policy, an annuity or
endowment contract, or any other interest in property. 6 ' There are
two areas involving indirect payments, however, which have caused
problems. These are payments for improvements to a residence, and
payments for insurance premiums. In each case, the issue is the
same: Are the payments "periodic" payments or are they part of an
underlying asset which constitutes a lump-sum transfer?
Payments for capital improvements to a residence cannot be
deducted as alimony if the underlying property is not alimony. For
example, in Gentry v. United States,7 ' payments by the husband
for extensive repairs to the wife's house did not qualify as alimony.
166. See Collins v. United States, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969), on remand from 393 U.S.
215 (1968), vacating 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968); Ann Y. Oliver, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 403 (1949);
Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
167. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(2) (1957).
169. Id.
170. 283 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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The transfer of the house itself was not alimony, and the repairs
were therefore held by the Court of Claims to be nondeductible
capital improvements.
Payments on a mortgage, are viewed differently. The Fourth
Circuit had originally held that periodic payments did not qualify
as alimony because the wife was obligated in the divorce decree to
apply the payments to the mortgage on the house where the hus-
band and wife owned the house jointly. 7' The Internal Revenue
Service later surrendered this victory, reversing its position in rul-
ing" that where husband and wife are joint owners, the portion of
the mortgage payments made by the husband which relates to the
wife's equity in the house is alimony.'73 This is true even though the
payments are capital expenditures in the sense that they serve to
increase the wife's equity. If the husband's payments result in an
increase in his equity in the house, however, they will not be treated
as alimony.'
Where the husband rents a house for the wife to use, the Tax
Court has held that the rental payments can qualify as alimony. '
On the other hand, if the husband buys the house and then lets the
wife use it rent free, the fair rental value would not be deemed
alimony because the initial agreement to let the wife use the house
would be a lump-sum transfer.' 6
Another common provision for indirect payment in property
settlement agreements and divorce decrees concerns life insurance.
If the husband agrees to name the wife as the beneficiary of his life
insurance policy and to pay the premiums, are the premium pay-
ments alimony? The key to whether insurance premiums qualify as
alimony is whether the wife receivespresent economic benefits from
the payments. If not, the wife Will receive only a lump-sum benefit
at death. Payments resulting in present economic benefits can be
accomplished with certitude only by assigning to the wife formal
171. Deininger v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 221 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 853
(1963).
172. Rev. Rul. 67-420, 1967.2 C.B. 63.
173. See also Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17.
174. Robert S. Fisher, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1135 (1970); James P. Bradley, 30 T.C. 701
(1958).
175. Doris B. Marinello, 54 T.C. 577 (1970).
176. Pappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947); James P. Bradley, 30 T.C. 701
(1958).
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legal title plus all of the substantive ownership rights in the policy.'77
The ownership by the wife must not be merely a matter of form.
If the wife is the formal owner with some rights while other rights
of ownership are denied her, it is uncertain whether the premiums
paid by the husband will qualify as alimony. In Stevens v.
Commissioner7 s the Second Circuit reversed a 1969 decision of the
Tax Court and held that the premiums were alimony. The wife was
the record owner, but her right to receive the proceeds upon the
death of the husband was limited to unpaid alimony, while her
rights to change the beneficiary, borrow on the policy and surrender
the policy were subject to court order. The Tax Court persisted in
William H. Broderson, 79 holding that premiums paid under similar
circumstances were not alimony. Broderson was reviewed by the full
Tax Court and was not appealed. The earlier Stevens case was
distinguished on the grounds that it involved a whole life, rather
than a term insurance policy. The court also offered the somewhat
dubious distinction that in Broderson, the husband had retained
possession of the policy, whereas in Stevens he had not.
To assure alimony treatment, not only must the wife presently
own all the rights to the policy, her rights must be completely vested
and nonforfeitable. The Court of Claims in Cosman v. United
States8 ' held that premiums were not alimony even though the wife
was the record owner, because her rights were forfeitable if she
remarried or if she failed to survive her husband. The court con-
cluded that the wife had received no present economic benefit from
the payment of the premiums.'"' In Seligmann v. Commissioner"2
the Seventh Circuit, on facts similar to those in Cosman, held that
not only must the wife receive a present economic benefit, but also
such benefit must be presently measurable in dollars and cents. The
existence of a contingency that the wife might remarry and lose her
rights to the proceeds deprived her economic interest of present
177. E.g., Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939
(1965); Hyde v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1962); Lois A. Cole, 40 T.C.M. (P-H)
71,073 (1971); Rev. Rul. 70-218, 1970-1 C.B. 19.
178. 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 711 (1969).
179. 57 T.C. 412 (1971).
180. 440 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
181. See also Weil v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957); Griffith v. United
States, 245 F. Supp. 678 (D. N. J. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 360 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1966); Rev.
Rul. 70-218, 1970-1 C.B. 19.
182. 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953).
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measurability. Thus the premium payments were held not to be
alimony. The Tax Court also has held that premiums were not
alimony where the contingency of the wife's death terminated the
husband's obligation to keep up the premium payments."3 The
stated rationale was that such contingency prevented the wife from
having an absolutely vested present economic interest. The Third
Circuit has agreed.' 4
The opposite circumstance, in which the wife is not the record
owner but does own all of the substantive attributes of ownership,
may be sufficient to preserve alimony treatment for the premiums,
but it presents risks. In Anita L. Ellis'5 the wife was named as
irrevocable beneficiary although title to the policy remained in the
husband's name. The premiums were held to be alimony by the Tax
Court. However, the position of the Internal Revenue Service re-
mains that failure to transfer record ownership of the policy to the
wife prevents alimony treatment for the premiums.' 6
Short of a transfer of all attributes but formal title, even the
Tax Court has refused to find alimony. In Harold Ostrov, "7 the Tax
Court held the premiums not to be alimony because, although the
wife was otherwise the complete owner and an irrevocably desig-
nated beneficiary, the husband reserved the right to borrow against
the cash surrender value. It is not clear whether alimony treatment
was denied because the borrowing destroyed only the cash surrender
value or because it could also reduce the potential proceeds. If only
the former, then, by analogy, premiums for term insurance might
never qualify as alimony since term insurance has no cash surrender
value.' s The Tax Court has come close to this view. It has held that
premiums for term insurance owned by the husband but naming the
wife as irrevocable beneficiary are not alimony.8 9 This is hard to
defend without ruling out term insurance premiums altogether since
being named the irrevocable beneficiary is the only major incident
of ownership that term insurance provides. Some term insurance is
183. James P. Bradley, 30 T.C. 701 (1958).
184. Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965); Griffith v. United States,
245 F. Supp. 678 (D. N. J. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 360 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1966).
185. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 736 (1973).
186. Rev. Rul. 57-125, 1957-1 C.B. 27.
187. 53 T.C. 361 (1969).
188. See Stevens v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g 28 T.C.M. (CCH)
711 (1969).
189. William H. Broderson, 57 T.C. 412 (1971).
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renewable or carries level premiums for five years at a time, but
these are minor incidents at best. Of course, one might argue -that
being named irrevocable beneficiary plus having the premiums paid
does not result in a present economic benefit to the wife, but this
argument appears weak since the wife would have a present eco-
nomic benefit in that she would be relieved of the burden of apply-
ing for such coverage.
Even if the husband agrees to make an absolute present trans-
fer coupled with a non-contingent promise to pay the premiums
until his death regardlesg of what happens to the wife, such a trans-
fer may present other tax problems. If the husband makes an abso-
lute transfer of an existing insurance policy, the cash surrender
value of the policy will be taxable to the husband to the extent that
it exceeds the total premiums (the cost) paid by the husband. 9"
Moreover, it apparently will do no good to arrange the payment of
the premiums so that the husband first pays an equivalent amount
directly to the wife with a requirement that she pay the premiums
herself. In Cosman v. United States, 9' the Court of Claims held that
such payments to the wife were not alimony since she was required
to use them to pay the premiums on an insurance policy held in
trust under which the wife was only a contingent beneficiary. It
appears that the only safe way to render payments for insurance
premiums taxable as alimony is to make the payments directly to
the wife with no requirements that she use the money to pay the
premiums. If the wife is not required to pay the premiums, the
amounts paid directly to her should not be disqualified as alimony
simply because she does in fact use them to pay the premiums.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The two competing policies underlying the present taxation of
alimony have been reviewed. The broad questions of legislative in-
tent and the constitutionality of the taxation of alimony, as well as
the relationships between the alimony provisions and other analo-
gous areas of tax law have been examined, as have the numerous
problems that have arisen in the more than thirty years of experi-
ence with the alimony provisions. The question remains, which is
the preferable policy upon which to base the taxation of alimony:
190. Samuel Morrison, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 740 (1956).
191. 440 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
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should alimony payments be viewed as a splitting of the husband's
income, or should they be viewed as expense payments in discharge
of his obligation of support?
The income-splitting policy seems preferable on several
grounds. First, it would seem to reflect more closely the legislative
history of alimony taxation. The legislature's reasoning seems to be
premised on the belief that a portion of the husband's income is
really the wife's income. Second, the income-splitting rationale ap-
pears to be on firmer constitutional ground. The question would not
be whether a payment from husband to wife could constitutionally
be "income," but rather whether the wife could stand in the hus-
band's shoes and thus derive "income" from the same sources as the
husband could have done.
Third, the income-splitting policy would not come into conflict
with the long-standing policy that support payments during a mar-
riage are not income. A clear cut analogy to joint returns and com-
munity property income could be drawn. The Poe v. Seaborn'92
holding would seem directly applicable. Finally, all of the practical
problems inherent in the distinction between payments for support
and payments for other marital rights would be avoided.
Still, a problem would remain in differentiating between pay-
ments of income and payments of capital. Claims against specific
pieces of property would be controlled by the nature of that property
as income or capital. As to sources of current income (borrowing an
idea from section 682 trusts) the statute might contain a presump-
tion that a payment was not out of current income unless secured
by an assignment or pledge of a particular source of current income.
It might be simpler to administer a rule which states that all
payments are considered to be out of current income, up to a maxi-
mum of one-half of the husband's adjusted gross income each year,
with no carryovers to future years. Even this rule might not yield
readily predictable results to the wife if the husband's income was
uncertain or fluctuated widely. Further, there would be a problem
in ensuring that the wife could discover at year's end the husband's
income for the year.
Again borrowing from section 682, it would also seem fairer to
adopt the conduit rule for all alimony payments. This would pre-
vent capital gains and tax-exempt income from being converted
192. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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arbitrarily into ordinary income in the hands of the wife, but this
would simultaneously increase the complexity of the law as well as
increase the problems the wife might have in predicting her taxes
in advance and in obtaining information from the husband at year's
end. If lack of certainty and the lack of communication should be
regarded as problems of sufficient magnitude, the present ten-year
rule could be retained, although, as noted above, this rule poses a
plethora of additional problems.
All of these income versus capital problems could be avoided,
of course, by adopting the obligation-of-support policy as the touch-
stone. Such a rule would allow a deduction for all payments for
support even if the funds came from the husband's savings rather
than current income. This would be consistent with the treatment
of all other deductible expenses in that the source would be ignored.
Practical problems then would flow from the need to distinguish
payments for support from payments for other marital rights such
as.dower or the wife's statutory share. Payments for reasons not at
all related to the marriage would be somewhat easier to distinguish,
but would also present problems. For example, repayments of loans
or of specific property which the wife originally had brought to the
marriage might be confused with payments for support.
The current statute attacks this problem by requiring the obli-
gation to be spelled out in one of the listed types of written docu-
ments. Still, the parties are not dealing at arms length over this
point since both should agree that their goal is to keep their com-
bined taxes as low as possible. Thus, the requirement of a writing
does not add much. The parties are quite free to manipulate the
document to suit their common purpose of reducing taxes. Even if
a method were found for separating payments for support from other
payments with some certainty, one might still question whether the
husband ought to be allowed a deduction for what is really a per-
sonal expense. It is true that some extraordinary personal expenses
such as major medical expenses and casualty losses are permitted
as deductions, but alimony may not be perceived as falling into a
similar category.
Also to be considered is the nondeductible treatment of support
payments during a marriage. If a married couple files a joint return,
denial of the deduction makes little difference. For those who do not
file a joint return, however, consistency would demand that an
equivalent deduction for the husband (with income to the wife) be
permitted. One problem, however, would be in distinguishing be-
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tween deductible support and nonductible gifts paid between mar-
ried taxpayers who do not file joint returns, If this line could not be
drawn and gifts had to be deductible as between married couples,
the next logical step would be to allow a deduction for all gifts (with
income recognized by the donee) and thus repeal section 102 alto-
gether. Few would want to go this far, and since the delineation is
so difficult, it would seem better not to use the obligation-of-support
policy at all.
On balance, then, considerations of legislative history, consti-
tutionality, consistency with the taxation of related areas (such as
community property, support between married couples, gifts and
joint returns), and especially the practical problems which have
arisen under both policies, all seem to suggest that income-splitting
is the preferable policy. Alimony treatment should apply to any
payment by the husband to the wife out of his income.
